The European Union as determinant of Croatian trade policy by Boromisa, Ana-Maria
Chapter 6
THE EUROPEAN UNION AS
DETERMINANT OF CROATIAN
TRADE POLICY
Ana-Maria Boromisa
Croatian Energy Regulatory Council (VRED)
Zagreb
Mia Mikiæ
Faculty of Economics
Zagreb
ABSTRACT
This paper identifies the degree to which the Republic of
Croatia is prepared for EU integration in the area of trade and trade pol-
icy. According to a comparative analysis of the extent of integration
into the European market, of Croatian trade policy and the policies of
applicant countries, as well as of the conditions placed before the appli-
cants by the EU, and the specific features of the EU trade regime, we
determine where Croatia is relative to the other applicants. The next
section identifies the key measures that need passing in the Republic of
Croatia for adjustment to the EU and its trade institutions and to facil-
itate the free movement of goods between Croatia and the EU. The
conclusion is that during the transition period, the reforms necessary
for joining the EU were not carried out, and that progress is slower than
in the other applicant countries. However, since Croatia started the EU
convergence process at a higher level of development than some of the
applicants, this lagging behind in the preparations for accession have
not entirely wiped out the “first-mover” advantages of Croatia. The
question arises, however, as to whether these will completely disappear
with the first phase in the imminent enlargement of the EU. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this paper is on the impacts of EU-related factors
on trade policy in the Republic of Croatia. This impact will be gauged
by an analysis of the intensity of Croatian trade and integration into the
EU, by an analysis of the adjustment of Croatian trade policy and reg-
ulations for the purpose of preparation for association, and an identifi-
cation of the specific features of the EU trade regime with third coun-
tries. The paper starts with a determination of the criteria for EU mem-
bership, and a review of the level to which these criteria are met in the
Republic of Croatia. On the basis of this review, which, to the extent
possible, is founded on quantitative indicators, the initial situation in
Croatia with respect to the EU is determined, i.e., how much Croatia
meets those conditions for membership that relate to trade policy. The
identification of the current situation serves as a point of departure for
an analysis of the further preparations of the Republic of Croatia for
joining the EU, primarily those capable of enabling the free movement
of goods between Croatia and the EU, and adjustment with the EU
trade regime with third countries. And then based on this analysis, we
identify the factors that are slowing down integration of the Republic
of Croatia into the European market and follow this up with recom-
mendations for those responsible for trade and economic policies in the
country.
TRADE POLICY AND CRITERIA FOR
MEMBERSHIP IN THE EU
A trade policy is the system of laws, regulations, international
agreements and negotiating positions that some state applies in order to
be able to provide a legally binding market approach for domestic pro-
ducers. The trade policy of each country is always, by definition,
nationalistic, because the foreign product or producer is always dis-
criminated against for the benefit of the domestic. One of the important
tasks of the international trade system (GATT/WTO) is to minimise
and forestall the uncontrolled employment of the discriminatory trade
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policies of given countries. For this reason, member states of WTO do
not have full freedom from the point of view of formulating their own
trade policies, but have to follow the principles, rules and obligations
agreed upon among member countries and translated into agreements.i
These agreements, of course, do allow every state to a certain extent to
respect distinct national (social and economic) interests.ii This goes for
both the Republic of Croatia and for the EU. Thus the trade policy of
the EU (ever since its origins in the Treaty of Rome) has been guided
by: a) the need to accept GATT/WTO rules; b) the need to satisfy the
objectives of common policies at EU level (such as the CAP); c) the
need to replace the long-term non-existing common foreign policy; d)
the need to satisfy the general goals of EU growth and development
(including the narrower goals of protecting employment and econom-
ic structure). Similarly, Croatian trade policy is given shape within the
context of the restrictions that are laid down by membership in the
WTO and in regional trade agreements, and by its expressed intention
to join the EU.
Trade integration into the EU and a specific kind of trade poli-
cy are not imposed as economic conditions for membershipiii, but do
serve as elements for an evaluation of the level of preparation for mem-
bership in line with the methodology developed by the European
Commission in the document Agenda 2000 (European Commission,
1997). Through this methodology, the Commission regularly, once a
year, monitors the level to which applicants have met the membership
criteria and their progress.iv
Price and trade liberalisation, the existence of a legal system,
sustainable public finances and external accounts are some of the
indicators according to which the first economic criteria about the
establishment of an effective market economy in an applicant coun-
try are evaluated.v
The other economic criteria are a developed capacity to cope
with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union.
Meeting this criterion requires a minimum level of competitiveness in
the main economic sectors of the candidate country. It means, among
other things, the existence of an effective market economy; appropri-
ate measures of government policy and legislation to stimulate compet-
itiveness (trade policy, competition policy, state aids, support for
SMEs), and the degree and the pace of trade integration a country
achieves with the Union before the enlargement (the volume and
nature of traded goods).vi
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CONVERGENCE OF CROATIA WITH THE
EU: ILLUSION OR REALITY
The remainder of this paper will analyse three groups of fac-
tors that are crucial in finding answers to the question posed in this
heading. First is an analysis of the quantitative indicators of the
degree of Croatian integration into the EU market. After that the for-
mal, institutional indicators of the effects of trade and general eco-
nomic policy are analysed: price and trade liberalisation, the exis-
tence of a system of trade laws and the implementation of adjust-
ments for access to the single internal market. These indicators are
selected in line with the methodology that is used by the European
Commission in its Regular Reports on candidates’ progress towards
accession (see for example European Commission, 2002b); they are
also defined as key areas for the implementation of the SAA (see for
example Vlada RH, 2002, European Commission, 2002e).
The third group of factors that might reflect Croatia’s degree
of preparation for membership relates to other elements of the trade
regime of the EU towards third countries and a comparison with the
Croatian regime.
Trade integration
The EU is the most important trade partner of Croatia – 54%
of the total foreign trade of the Republic of Croatia is with member
states (Figure 1 and Table 1). However, the share of imports from
Croatia in total EU imports in the transitional period (1993-2000) fell
from 0.4 to 0.2%, without any sign of improvement in the structure
and scope. The structural change index for Croatian exports altered
less than in the applicant countries (Table 2), and it is still mostly tex-
tile and chemical products that are exported. The value of exports to
the EU rose by 12.4%, while that of imports almost doubled, which
led to a rise in the bilateral trade deficit (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Croatian imports and exports, 1993-2001 (billion USD)
Volume of trade, i.e., the changes in market share, structural
changes of an export sample and the redirection of exports towards
more demanding markets are some of the indicators that are used to
measure the level of competitiveness. Since the share of Croatian prod-
ucts in the EU markets is falling (see column 4 of Table 2), and the
structure (column 2 of Table 2), or the size is not taking a desirable
direction (Table 1 and Fig. 1) it can be concluded that the competitive-
ness of Croatian products in the EU market is diminishing too, which
necessarily weakens the degree to which Croatia meets the member-
ship criteria. 
As against this, the countries of CEE have increased their shares
in total EU imports, from 7.8% to 13%, they have changed the struc-
ture of exports (Table 2), i.e., increased their ability to meet the com-
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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
(estimate)
Total exports 3.9 4.3 4.6 4.5 4.2 4.5 4.3 4.6 4.6
Exports to EU 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.5
Total imports 4.7 5.2 7.5 7.8 9.1 8.4 7.8 7.8 8.4
Imports from EU 2.6 3.1 4.7 4.6 5.4 4.9 4.4 4.4 4.7
Table 1. Croatian imports and exports, 1993-2001 (billion USD)
Source: DZS, 2002.
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petitive pressures on the EU market and have thus come closer to
meeting membership conditions. For example, Hungary, which in the
last Commission reports was placed among the most successful app-
licants, increased its exports to the EU from 4.9 billion euros in 1993
to 24.2 billion euros in 2001. Alongside volume, the nature of trade
is also a measure of trade integration with the EU. Thus more vigor-
ous intra-industry trade in products with a high degree of value added
is an indicator of similarity of productive structures (Landesmann,
1995), and is followed with fewer troubles (lower adjustment costs)
when a country joins the EU. For this reason, the extent to which total
trade is based on intra-industry trade can be considered to indicate a
higher level of satisfying the conditions for membership. The level of
intra-industry trade can be estimated by the Grubel-Lloyd index.viii
According to this indicator, Croatia can be considered comparable
with the second round of applicants (see column 3, Table 2). 
Candidate EU export Grubell- Exports to Imports from Relative
country structural Lloyd the EU as a the EU as a trade
change index index share of total share of total balance
(%) EU imports EU exports (%)
(%) (%)
1994-1998 1998 1993 2000 1993 2000 2000
Hungary 5.3 73.37 1 2.4 1.4 2.4 -6.20
Poland 4.3 49.63 1.8 2.6 2.4 3.6 -21.16
Estonia 0.8 45.86 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 -13.45
Slovenia 1.1 71.93 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.9 -6.20
Czech R. 4.6 70.13 1.2 2.5 1.5 2.8 -9.24
Bulgaria 0.7 40.77 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 14.27
Latvia 0.5 26.78 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 -26.14
Lithuania 0.6 30.23 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 -8.76
Romania 1.7 35.88 0.4 0.9 0.5 1.1 -11.48
Slovakia 2.0 60.79 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.8 -10.86
Macedonia - 24.46 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -22.48
BH - 23.61 0.007 0.05 0.02 0.12 -58.95
Albania - 36.85 0.02 0.03 0.1 0.1 60.27
Croatia 0.5 36.85 0.4 0.2 1.8 0.5 -30.77
FRY - - 0.0004 0.1 0.01 0.02 -52.34
Table 2. Selected trade indicatorsvii
Source: COMEXT, 2002
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In its trade with the EU, Croatia has a relative trade deficit larger
than all the applicants. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia have
relative trade deficits comparable with the EU overall trade deficitix,
while the indicators for Croatia are comparable with Latvia, and just
somewhat better than the other countries of the western Balkans (see col-
umn 6 in Table 2).
At the same time, the applicants have mainly increased their shares
in the EU market, the increase being correlated with a change in export
structure (columns 4 and 2 of Table 2) and with the level of intra-industry
trade. Commission reports show a strong positive correlation between
change of export structure and level of GL index on one hand and appli-
cant progress on the other. As for Croatia, its market share has dropped,
export structure has remained unchanged, and its exports are less differen-
tiated than in the more advanced applicant countries. It is mainly tradition-
al, labour-intensive products with low value added that are exported from
Croatia to the EU (textiles, timber, wood products and so on).
In accordance with this it can be concluded that our progress
towards satisfying the criteria for membership is very meagre and that
Croatia is at the level of the less advanced applicants.
Other indicators, for example openness indicators, also lead to the
same conclusion about Croatian non-convergence with the EU. In line
with the traditional theory of international trade, openness implies ratio-
nalisation of the productive system and enables optimal resource alloca-
tion, and suggests a potential for rapid growth and restructuring. Total
trade as a proportion of GDP [(export + import)/GDP] is one of the indi-
cators of the degree of openness of an economy. Other applicants main-
ly show a high degree of openness, which also has a tendency to rise,
while the degree of openness of Croatia is comparable with that of
Romania and Poland (Table 3). The signs of a rise in openness and of
other indicators (which could not have been encompassed by this paper)
in 2000, may indicate that stagnation has ended and reform started.
Table 3. Degree of openness of Croatia and some other applicant countries,
1997-2001 (%)
CRO LIT LAT EST BUG POL ROM SVK SLO HUN CR
1997 65 120 111 168 112 55 65 122 116 91 119
1998 59 112 116 170 94 62 53 129 115 103 119
1999 60 99 98 159 95 59 61 126 109 109 123
2000 69 95 100 192 117 66 72 146 122 127 143
2001 - 102 101 185 119 63 75 161 121 123 145
Source: Calculated by A. B. according to DZS (2002) and DG Trade (2002)
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Is the EU a natural trade partner for Croatia?
According to the basic idea of the “theory” of natural trade part-
ners, regional trade liberalisation among countries that are “natural”
trade partners will not lead to any considerable “trade diversion”.x A
natural trade partner is defined as that with which some country
(Croatia, for example) has ample bilateral trade without there being
any trade policy incentives. Hence it is necessary to define the deter-
minants that enable a large volume of trade among countries. For an
analysis of the volume of trade, the so-called gravity model is used.
This model, by the simplest specification, explains the volume (and
geographical structure ) of the bilateral trade flow for a given country
(or region) with different partners, using a series of explanatory vari-
ables: a) GDP or per capita GDP of the trade partner countries, b) trade
barriers such as transport and other trading costs (defined by the dis-
tance between the countries), and c) factors that foster trade, such as a
common border, common language, common legislation and so on.
By testing the gravity modelxi, however, it is impossible to
determine with a high degree of confidence that geographical closeness
or distance is a key variable in determining the natural trade partner.
Accordingly, when the Republic of Croatia decides on trade liberalisa-
tion with the existing regional blocs, the crucial factor in the choice of
bloc to which one ought to open up cannot be distance but the econom-
ic strength of the bloc itself. The higher level of GDP in EU members
than in members of CEFTA and the western Balkans shows that the
EU is the regional bloc with which liberalisation of trade would lead to
a greater increase of national prosperity. What is more, with EU
enlargement, this partner will become still more natural. 
Institutional indicators of convergence
Price liberalisation
The use of administered prices in Croatia is limited to agricul-
tural products, energy and transport. This level of price liberalisation,
according to the criteria of the European Commission, is considered
advanced, and is comparable with applicant countries that meet the cri-
teria for the existence of an effective market economic (European
Commission, 2002e). 
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Trade liberalisation
Liberalisation of trade in the Republic of Croatia to date is a
reflection of membership in the WTO and the conclusion of free trade
agreements (bilateralxii and with EFTA) and the intention to join the EU. 
By joining the WTO, Croatia bound itself to gradually reduce its
customs duties on industrial and agricultural products to the level that is
applied in OECD countries by the year 2005. Export and quantitative
restrictions or measures that have a similar effect have been abolished.
Trade with the EU is regulated by the Interim Agreement that
enables application of the commercial provisions of the SAA until the
process of ratification is completed. The Interim Agreement contractu-
ally regulates trade preferences somewhat more favourably than those
that were applied to Croatia from the collapse of the SFRY onwards.
That is, the institutional links between Croatia and the European Co-
mmunity were regulated up to 1992 by the same instruments that were
joining the SFRY and the Community. Pursuant to the Cooperation
Agreement Croatia had preferential access to the market of the Euro-
pean Community, and also a preferential position vis-à-vis other states
in the region (cf. Samardija, 1994; 160-169).
According to the currently valid Interim Agreement, Croatian
industrial products, all processed agricultural products, apart from wine,
baby-beef and beef products, have duty-free access to the EU market
without any quantitative restrictions. Croatia bound itself to liberalise
access to its market gradually, over a period of six years; since 1
January 2002, about 77% of trade in industrial products has been liber-
alised; trade in textile and steel products will gradually be liberalised by
1 January 2006, and by 1 January 2007 trade in all other industrial prod-
ucts. With respect to agricultural products, 75% of the trade will be lib-
eralised by 1 January 2006, 41% by the abolition of customs duties and
34% by preferential treatment covering traditional trade. By the end of
the transitional period, trade in processed agricultural and fish products
will have been totally liberalised (European Commission, 2002e).
States that are applicants for membership liberalised their trade
with the EU in line with the provisions of the Europe Agreements by 1
January 2002. To reach this level of integration with the EU, in line with
the provisions of the SAA, Croatia will need another five years.
Along with liberalisation of trade with the EU and attempts to
enter CEFTA, Croatia has bound itself to join in regional free trade
zones in the west Balkans. The establishment of regional cooperation
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became a standard provision of agreements between the EU and third
countries (e.g., the European Agreements, the Euro-Mediterranean
Agreements concerning associated membership, the Cotonou Con-
ventionxiii, for more see below). This form of cooperation was
achieved by applicants by the creation of CEFTA, and completion of
negotiations about a free trade agreement with FRY and Albania is
awaiting Croatia, and perhaps the making of the bilateral free trade
agreements multilateral.
The system of trade laws 
The basis of the EU is a single market, in which, in conditions of
free competition, there is a free movement of goods, services, capital and
people. Hence, for convergence with the EU, application of the rule of
market competition on the one hand, and transparent, limited state aid on
the other, are crucial. Like the states of CEE, Croatia is faced with difficul-
ties in the establishment and implementation of a legislative and institu-
tional framework necessary to set up an effective market economy.
According to the provisions of the SAA (Article 70), in the trade
relationships between the EU and Croatia, the rules of market competi-
tion and state aid according to Union legislation will be applied. Most
applicants, in this area, have to develop or adjust their rules about the
allotment of state aid and step up provisions for the prevention of the
restriction of competition and the abuse of a dominant position on the
market. For the sake of a satisfactory implementation of the SAA,
Croatia ought by the end of 2002 to have set up an independent agency
for state aid, and an agency for the protection of market competition
should have been expanded and be able to control mergers. 
Preparation for integration into the internal market
Since through the Europe Agreements the applicants set up free
trade zones with the EU, further liberalisation measures mainly relate
to integration into the single European market. Future measures will
relate to the abolition of border non-tariff barriers: physical, technical
and fiscal. The further integration of candidates takes for granted the
adjustment of economic policy with that of the current member states
and the acceptance of the standards and rules of the Union (the acquis).
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Gradual adoption of EU legislation in the area of standardisation,
metering, certification and accreditation is an obligation that Croatia
took upon itself by signing the SAA. The State Bureau for Stand-
ardisation and Metering, in cooperation with the Ministry for European
Integration and the Legislation Office, is drawing up a national strate-
gy for the adoption of the technical legislation, while the application of
standards is not obligatory.
It took Austria, Sweden and Denmark three years before joining
the EU to adopt measures of this kind (Baldwin; Francois, Portes, 1997).
EU trade policy
The current common trade policy of the Union is mostly beyond
the control of the member states (although the effects of the policy have
of course a direct effect on their economies).xiv Following the principle of
creating “an open market economy with free market competition” the pol-
icy has a different effect on the member economies with different eco-
nomic structures and various degrees of dependence on trade with the
world (for more detail, cf. Messerlin, 2001). The common trade policy
can be analysed from several aspects: the level of protection that is afford-
ed to member states, its use for the purposes of other Union policies (agri-
culture, industry, development, competition, foreign policy), the preferen-
tial nature of the policy and so on. Although all aspects of trade policy are
very important for applicant states, here we shall deal only with the nature
of trade policy towards non-member countries as well as with the possi-
bility that applicant countries make an impact on adjustment of this
regime to meet their goals and strategies in the current round of negotia-
tions within the WTO.
The widely-popularised characteristic of Union trade policy is
dependence on discriminatory or preferential trade agreements that start-
ed to develop as early as the Treaty of Rome. Thus in 1999 the EU had
contractual and reciprocal bilateral agreements with 22 countries and
contractual but non-reciprocal bilateral agreements with 77 countries.
This means that the EU is the source of 40% of all preferential trade
agreements reported to the WTO, and if EFTA and CEFTA are includ-
ed, the common contribution to the creation of preferential arrangement
grows to two thirds of all such agreements in the world (Messerlin, 2001;
197). A particular feature of these agreements is their differentiated lev-
els of preference, which has become known as the trade preferences
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pyramid. The pyramid contains six levels: trade partners without most
favoured nation treatment (MFN), the then socialist countries that were
non-members of GATT; trade partners with GATT MFN status – mem-
bers of the OECD outside the Union; trade partners to which the General
System of Preferences, GSP, was applied; trade partners in the
Mediterranean; trade partners with the status of developing countries –
ACP states and, finally, trade partners with the highest preferences –
EFTA countries the only ones that had reciprocal preferences (a free
trade area for industrial products).xv This pyramidal structure was great-
ly modified by a change in the EU regime towards the central European
countries (but then again, not so much to disappear completely – see
Table 4 which illustrates the remains of the pyramidal construction of
import tariff protection in the EU). Candidates for EU membership have
gone from the lowest preference status to practically the highest level
along with EFTA and members of the European Economic Area, EEA,
which has had an adverse effect on the relative position of the groups of
countries who previously had greater margin of preference than them. At
the same time, the character of the regime was changed, and no longer
had dominantly non-reciprocal preferences but instead it had dominant-
ly reciprocal preferences (except for the least developed countries – with
no time limit, and for ACP starting in 2008 with a 12 year transition peri-
od) consistent with WTO rules.xvi
Table 4. Remains of the trade preferences pyramid of the Community, 1999.
Simple average of import tariff  rates (%)
Product MFN MFN GSP FTA LDCs Loméc Loméc
related applied +MFN +MFN +MFN +GSP +LDCs
+MFN +MFN
All products 7.0 6.9 4.9 3.5 1.9 1.9 1.8
Agricultural 17.4 17.3 15.7 16.7 10.3 10.3 9.5
productsa
Non agricultural 4.6 4.5 2.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
productsb
FTA - free trade area.
GSP - general system of preferences.
LDC - least developed countries.
Lomé - ACP countries (African, Carribean, Pacific countries).
MFN - most-favoured nation.
a As defined in the Annexe I WTO agriculture agreement.
b Remaining products.
c From 2000, the Lomé Convention was renamed the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.
Source: WTO, Trade Policy Review: The European Union, 2000 (cf Messerlin, 2001)
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Notwithstanding the “promotion” in their trade status, the can-
didate countries are faced with very high costs (related to the static
effects of liberalisation on the creation and diversion of trade) for two
reasons. Firstly, the real improvement in preferential treatment (differ-
ence between the MFN customs rate and the 0% rate) is not particular-
ly important, because a large number of such countries already had a
relatively free approach to the EU market for non-sensitive products.
One exception, of course, is textile products and clothing, which for six
central European countries have since 1997/987 been exempt from
customs and quotas. At the same time, a positive effect of the prefer-
ences is derogated by the complex rules of origin.xvii Another cause of
the high costs of liberalisation is change in applicants’ trade policy
towards the non-EU countries in the pre-accession period. Candidates,
that is, have reduced trade barriers against EU member states (and
against other candidates in their trade with each other) but have often
compensated for this by increasing the level of protection vis-à-vis
countries that are not members of the EU. Since the likelihood of the
trade diversion effect is thus increased, this approach to liberalisation
does clearly not have to have a positive effect on the welfare of the can-
didates.xviii
All candidate countries, after entry into the EU, have to accept
all the existing regulations, but will be able to take part in the making
of any new rules. For this reason it is in the interest of the current mem-
bers to make sure that new agreements within the WTO include provi-
sions which assure the accomplishment of their objectives in the future,
provisions that do not necessarily suit the candidates. For this reason
one has to consider how much does the stance of the candidates with
respect to multilateralism and the functioning of the WTO coincide
with that of the EU. If the degree of concurrence is not great, to what
extent can the candidates have an impact on the modification of the
European position? 
An EU delegation went to the ministerial meeting in Doha (No-
vember 2001) with clearly delineated objectives for the new round of
negotiations within the WTO. These, put most concisely, include (cf.
European Commission, 2000) further liberalisation of and access to the
market for goods and services not relying on a sectoral approach,
improvement of WTO rules by the inclusion of new areas such as
investment, competition and advancement of trade, promotion of sus-
tainable development and the more direct regulation of matters that
arouse public interest, such as the effect of trade on the environment.
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Unlike the EU, the candidate countries (including Croatia) did not have
in Doha any formal common position (except informally, e.g., CEFTA
plus). From the published positions of each individual country
(www.wto.org) it would appear that their goals in the new round of
negotiations are close to EU objectives. Taking into account the very
different levels of development and of economic structures of the can-
didates as compared to the EU mean, this relative overlap of goals
shows that the candidates are not ready, or are not powerful enough, to
initiate questions in a multilateral forum that are in their interests and
might be against the stated aims of the EU (for instance, in the area of
investment, TRIPS and so on).xix From a review of the trade policies of
the candidates, it would seem that they are trying to replicate EU trade
policy not only in the area of protective instruments but also in form-
ing bilateral preferential arrangements (as against relying on multilat-
eral liberalisation). The level of protection, though, is not in agreement
with the EU level (although similar, they are on average very different
for individual groups of products). When the level of protection in the
candidate country is higher than in the EU, a good strategy in this
round of negotiations would be to approximate to a lower EU level. If
the candidate already has protection equal to or lower than the EU, the
question arises of whether the candidates can “force” the EU, while
negotiation the accession, to come down to their level of protection, or
leave it the option of paying compensation to WTO members when
acceding candidates will have to adopt the higher level of the EU pro-
tection.
CHALLENGES IN ADJUSTMENT TO THE EU
The preceding analysis leads to the conclusion that Croatia is
slower than the other applicants in carrying out reforms necessary for
accession to the EU. From this analysis it also derives that the EU is a
“natural” market for Croatia and that it, like the candidates, is not will-
ing at the moment to carry out any particularly different trade policy
than that being run by the EU.
For this reason we shall identify the factors that might positive-
ly or negatively affect the further convergence of Croatia to the EU.
The imminent process of EU enlargement is very important. Although
it is not clear what the EU will be like after this enlargement, one of the
possible scenarios is that the willingness of a new EU with 20 mem-
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bers for new enlargement will be much smaller. Taking this scenario as
a possible one could well reduce Croatian motivation for the imple-
mentation of reforms already provided for. In addition, the most
marked comparative advantages of producers in Croatia lie in the pro-
duction of traditional products (fisheries, wood and textile products), in
which the competition will be increased with the accession of new
transitional members.
For this reason, during the period of adjustment to the EU, it is
necessary to consider adjustments to an enlarged EU, i.e., an EU of 20
to 28 members, and of acceding to this much larger union when the
conditions are met.
In spite of the high possible costs of integration (restructuring
costs), the establishment and consistent implementation of obligations
taken on can help in the creation of favourable investment conditions.
The establishment of free trade zones in the region will make it possi-
ble for transitional economies to prepare to face the competitive pres-
sures on the EU market. The strengthening of inter-regional trade can
make specialisation possible and facilitate its heading in the direction
of activities with greater value added.
Although access to the EU market is unlimited and duty-free for
most of the Croatian products, this kind of regime of access to the EU
market does not make it possible to adjust the export structure of the
Republic of Croatia in accordance with its comparative advantages.
That is, Croatian producers have their greatest comparative advantages
in sectors in which access to the EU market is limited. These are fish-
eries and the production of tobacco products. 
Regional cooperation, which Croatia is obliged to carry out by
the SAA, can help in the process of restructuring. At the same time, the
introduction of the regular reports made by the European Commission
enables unbiased and consistent monitoring of the implementation of
reforms.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Work on the achievement of status of full member as fast as possible,
because this will minimise the static costs that derive from partial lib-
eralisation through implementation of the SAA. The proviso is that the
implementation of the SAA and other international obligations and
reforms already launched is a necessary condition for transformation.
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• As opposed to the position of Croatia in Doha, not to enter into
numerous bilateral preferential arrangements, especially if each of
them has separate rules of origin – this only increases the transaction
costs and trading costs. Existing bilateral agreements could be made
multilateral, which would reduce the administrative costs of imple-
menting and monitoring them.
• If the trade policy of the EU is accepted, it should be used, as in the
member states, as a support for development, industrial and competi-
tion policies and not as a merely passive protection policy.
i The basic agreements are those of trade in goods (GATT), in services (GATS), the pro-
tection of intellectual rights (TRIPS) and the settlement of disputes (DSM). 
ii This is put into practice by devices ranging from exceptions to the need to respect the
basic principles of the most favoured nation and national treatment (e.g., Article 24,
Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries) to failure to respect recom-
mendations about not using quotas, standards and so on for the protectionist purposes. 
iii Of course, by associating, an applicant country obliges itself gradually to create a free
trade zone and adjust its trade policy with the common trade policy of the Union. The
adjustment of applicants to the EU trade policy is monitored in the context of the gener-
al legal adjustments. Accession negotiations progress according to the pace of harmon-
isation to the acquis. Acceptance and implementation of the acquis implies that the
applicant has developed the ability to take on the obligations that arise from member-
ship. The negotiation chapters that relate to trade are: the free movement of goods
(Chapter 1), the free movement of services (Chapter 3), the free movement of capital
(part of Chapter 4), the negotiations of some states about the protection of intellectual
property (TRIPS, Chapter 5), and the establishment of the customs union (Chapter 25).
Most of the applicants have provisionally completed negotiations about these chapters,
which means that they will in the event that they do join the EU, be involved in the sin-
gle market and apply the common customs tariff with respect to third countries, i.e., they
will become a member of the customs union.
iv It also issues the Regular Reports as they are called. For more details see:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargemenet/report2001/index.htm#/Regular%20%20Reports 
v Other elements according to which the European Commission evaluates the effective-
ness of a market economy are: the equilibrium between supply and demand established
by the free interplay of market forces; absence of significant barriers to market entry
(establishment of new firms) ond exit (bankruptcies, liquidations); the legal system,
including the regulation of property rights ; macroeconomic stability achieved, includ-
ing price stability, sustainable public finances and external accounts; the existence of a
broad consensus about the essentials of economic policy, and a sufficiently developed
financial sector to channel savings towards productive investment.
vi The other elements according to which the capacity to cope with competitive pressures
within the Union are evaluated are the sufficiency of available resources with acceptable
costs (human potential, capital and infrastructure) with the possibility of their being devel-
oped and built upon (education, research), as well as a considerable proportion of SMEs
being involved in EU trade, because according to experience to day, such companies tend
to benefit more from improved market access, and partly because a dominance of large
firms could indicate a greater reluctance to adjust. (European Commission, 1997).
vii The figures given in the table are illustrative, and selected on the basis of a large num-
ber of figures from the 1993-2000 period.
viii This index, for some industrial product or economic activity “i”, is usually defined as
GLi= 1 - [/Exi-Imi/ / (Exi+ Imi)] where Ex indicators exports and Im imports. The clos-
er the index is to 1, the greater the level of intra-industry trade.
ix Relative trade deficit is defined as (x-m)/(x+m), where x is exports, and m is imports,
expressed in percentages.
x Trade diversion is expressed as the cost for a country that, because of the existence of
a formal trade agreement, diverts imports from a country that produces them efficiently
to a member country that is less efficient , and at the same time ceasing to charge import
duties therefore forgoing import tariff revenue.
xi More about the model used and the econometric results of the test available from the
authors.
xii In spite of the fact that bilateral agreements have not been ratified, the following
agreements are being provisionally applied: with BH (from 1 January 2001), Macedonia
(1 July 2002), Slovenia (1 July 2002), Hungary (1 April 2001), Czech R (1 January
2002), Slovakia (1 January 2002) and EU member countries (from 1 January 2002).
Agreements have been signed with Turkey and Poland, and negotiations with Albania,
FRY and Romania are under way.
xiii In 2000, the IV Lomé Convention ceased to exist , and the EU signed a new agree-
ment, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
countries.
xiv Trade policy, in line with the Treaty Establishing the European Community, consoli-
dated version after the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, OJ C 340/173 or europa.eu.int.eur-
lex/en.treaties/dat/ec_cons-treaty-en-pdf is considered one of the forms of commercial
policy and is clearly defined with respect to wider commercial policy. Control of trade
policy is within the jurisdiction of the Union, i.e., member states do not have a direct
control over it. EU institutions can carry out trade policy measures independently
without consulting the member states , and trade agreements are ratified only at the
level of the Union (there is no need for members to ratify them). As against this, con-
trol of commercial policy is divided between the Union and the member states, which
have more freedom in the area of regulation commercial presence and trends in pro-
duction factors (cf. Messerlin 2001 Chapters 4 and 5).
xv The first three levels were set by the EU unilaterally, and any of the more advanced sta-
tus was conditional upon contractual relations with the EU. The ACP developing coun-
tries were given trade preferences within the context of the EU development policy.
xvi The transformation of the regime, from non-reciprocal to reciprocal preferences, is
based upon the formation of new bilateral or regional preferential arrangements consis-
tent with WTO rules (especially Article 24).
xvii For example, it is sometimes cheaper to pay a tariff than to bear the costs of proving
the origin of the goods (Mayhew, 1998).
xviii The level of protection against non-members of the EU may rise because of the
process of joining the EU. For example, when Slovenia joins the EU, the provisions of
the free trade agreement between Croatia and Slovenia that enable the duty free and
unlimited imports of wine from Croatia into Slovenia will have to be abolished .
xix This is a judgement that still needs support in a more thorough analysis, which alas
could not be included in this paper.
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